Introduction

Zero-Knowledge Identification Schemes
The zero-knowledge identification scheme is a triple (K, P, V ) of probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms. A key-generator K generates a pair (pk, sk) of public and private keys on input of the security parameter k. A prover P with the secret key sk (and the public key pk) proves its identity to a verifier V (with the public key pk) through interactions showing its possession of sk in (honest-verifier) zero-knowledge.
The major security goal of identification schemes is to prevent an adversary A with no secret key sk from impersonating the authentic prover P . Such an adversary A is called passive if A only eavesdrops the message-flow between honest P and V (to impersonate P after that). If A acts as a cheating prover or verifier beyond eavesdropping, A is called an active adversary. In particular, if A can act as a cheating verifier concurrently against plural prover clones with the same secret key, it is called a concurrent attack, in which interest has been growing.
There are three well-known identification schemes: the Fiat-Shamir [6] , GQ [9] and Schnorr [11] identification schemes. The Fiat-Shamir scheme is proven to be secure against impersonation by an active adversary † The authors are with Institute of Information Security, Kanagawa, Japan.
based on the difficulty of the integer factorization problem. However, it needs rather long secret keys. The GQ identification scheme is an extension of the Fiat-Shamir scheme, which reduces both the number of messages exchanged and memory requirements for secret keys. The GQ identification scheme is proven to be secure against the passive and concurrent attacks under the RSA and One-More-Inversion assumptions, respectively [3] . The Schnorr identification scheme is an alternative to the Fiat-Shamir and GQ schemes. It is also proven to be secure against the passive and concurrent attacks under the DLA (Discrete Logarithmic Assumption) and One-More-DL assumptions, respectively [3] .
Provable Security of Identification Schemes
Let us briefly recall how the proof of the security against impersonation does work in the case of the Schnorr scheme. In the Schnorr scheme, P has a secret key x and V has a public key q, g, h(= g x ). First, P randomly chooses a from Z q , computes a commitment t = g a and sends t to V , which, in turn, randomly chooses a challenge c from Z q and sends c to P . Then, P responds y = a + xc to V . Finally, V sees whether y can correctly open h c t or not, that is, it checks the equality of g y = h c t. Suppose there is an adversary A that can impersonate a prover in the Schnorr scheme with a nonnegligible success probability. Using A we can construct the following simulator S which computes the discrete logarithm x of a given element h(= g x ). A simulator S invokes a copy of A, gives h to A as a public key of a prover in the Schnorr scheme, and plays the role of a verifier against A. That is, the simulator S, receiving a cheating commitment t * from A, sends a random challenge c to A and gets a cheating response y * . Then, we have g y * = h c t * with probability of A's success. Now, S rewinds A to the point receiving a challenge and sends a new random challenge c 1 once more to get a new response y * 1 from A. We have g y * 1 = h c1 t * also with probability of A's success. Using the two equations, S can compute the discrete logarithm x of h by
with some negligible function η (of security parameter k). This means a contradiction to DLA. Here, the running time t S of S is around the twice the running time
. The above (standard) proof depends on the wellknown technique "rewinding to extract." As seen above, the technique sacrifices efficiency of the reduction. The probability to extract the secret is only the square of probability of the successful attack.
The similar situation holds also for the FiatShamir and GQ schemes.
Our results
We show an identification scheme IDKEA1, which is an enhanced version of the Schnorr scheme. Although it needs four messages exchanged and slightly more exponentiations for both a prover and a verifier than the Schnorr scheme, the IDKEA1 is proved to be secure under the two assumptions of KEA1 [4] , [10] and DLA with tight reduction. Here, by the term "tight reduction" under two assumptions A 1 and A 2 we mean a reduction in which an adversary who breaks the scheme with probability in time t can be used to break the underlying problems of the assumption A i with probability i in time t i (i = 1, 2), and we have ≈ 1 + 2 and t ≤ Min(O(t 1 ), O(t 2 )).
The idea underlying the IDKEA1, which is inspired by Barak's generic non-back-box techniques [1] , [2] , is to use an extractable commitment for prover's commitment. The extractable commitment is actually extractable only by the simulator who can use the nonblack-box extractor of the KEA1 assumption. In the proof of security, the simulator can open the commitment in two different ways: one by the non-black-box extractor and the other through the simulated transcript. This means that we don't need to depend on the rewind technique and can prove the security without loss of the efficiency of reduction.
Our first theorem is as follows. In addition, using a variant OMDL+ of the OMDL assumption [3] , we can prove the IDKEA1 is secure even under the concurrent attack also with tight reduction: 
Related works
A signature scheme whose security can be tightly reduced to difficulty of the discrete logarithm problem in the standard model is proposed by Cramer and Damgard [5] . [5] built the signature scheme based on Σ-protocol, which can be viewed as a generalization of identification schemes treated in the presented paper. However, note that the security of Σ-protocol itself is not tightly reduced to difficulty of the discrete logarithm problem in [5] . Our aim here is at the security of an identification scheme itself, not at the resulting signature scheme. Bellare and Palacio [4] show a 3-Round ZeroKnowledge protocol in which the KEA3 assumption (a variant of KEA1) is used to prove its soundness. The role played by the KEA3 assumption is different from ours. In fact, the proof of the soundness in [4] needs the rewinding technique to extract the secret of the cheating prover.
Fischlin [7] shows a non-interactive proof of knowledge with online extractors. The online extractor plays the similar role as extractors (without rewinding) in the proof of our scheme. The online extractor needs the random oracle model and unfortunately the communication complexity (i.e., the length of the proof) in the scheme is rather high although it can be said feasible. Our scheme can be viewed as an interactive and practical (but restricted) version of [7] based on the non-black-box assumption instead of the random oracle.
Definitions and Assumptions
In this section, following [3] , we state the definitions of the security of identification schemes under the passive and concurrent attacks and introduce the KEA1 and OMDL+ assumptions.
Security definitions of identification schemes
Let a triple ID = (K, P, V ) of probabilistic polynomialtime algorithms be an identification scheme. A keygenerator K generates a pair (pk, sk) of public and private keys on input of the security parameter k. A prover P with the secret key sk (and the public key pk) proves its identity to verifier V (with the public key pk) through interactions showing its possession of sk.
The security of an identification scheme ID under the passive attack is defined as follows. In the following A 1 acts as an eavesdropper of conversations between an honest prover and an honest verifier. After halting A 1 with an output St, A 2 tries to impersonate the prover using St. The security of an identification scheme ID under the concurrent attack is defined as follows. In the following A 1 acts as a cheating verifier that can take place in concurrent sessions with plural prover clones P i (sk) with the same secret key sk. Those sessions can be interleaved in any ways. After halting A 1 with an output St, A 2 with St tries to impersonate the prover P (sk). 
Definition 2 (Security under concurrent attacks) Let a triple ID = (K, P, V ) of probabilistic polynomialtime algorithms be an identification scheme. Let
A = (A 1 , A 2 ) be
Assumptions on groups
We use three number-theoretic assumptions on groups: the DLA, KEA1 and OMDL+ assumptions. The DLA is the standard Discrete Logarithmic Assumption. We use the DLA in the concrete manner as follows. The group generator G that outputs a generator g of a group of order q, is called to satisfy (t, )-DLA if for any adversary A that runs in time at most t, we have
The probability is taken over the coins of G, randomness choosing x and the coins of A as usual. The definitions of the KEA1 and OMDL+ assumptions are as follows.
The KEA1 assumption
The KEA1 assumption [4] , [10] for a group G = g means that it is possible only when one knows b to generate a DH-pair (g b , g ab ) for a randomly selected g a . The KEA1 assumption in [4] is stated only in terms of the asymptotic behavior. The above concrete version of the definition seems to be natural with respect to the intrinsic meaning of the assumption.
The OMDL+ assumption
The OMDL+ assumption is a stronger version of the OMDL assumption used in [3] . The OMDL assumption means that it is difficult to solve one more DLP (Discrete Logarithmic Problem) instance even if one is provided with several randomly selected DLP instances with their answers, all sharing the same base element. The OMDL+ assumption is stronger in the sense that the challenge problems are given with some hints. is upper bounded by .
Definition 4 (OMDL+ Assumption) Let
It is easily seen that the OMDL+ assumption means the OMDL assumption and that the OMDL assumption means the CDH assumption or the OMDL+ assumption.
The Identification Scheme IDKEA1
We describe our identification scheme IDKEA1= {K, P, V }. Let G be a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm which given the security parameter k outputs a prime number q of k bits and a generator g of a group of order q.
A key-generation algorithm K of the IDKEA1 on input k runs G(k) to get q, g 1 , chooses x randomly from Z q , computes h 1 = g x 1 and outputs x and q, g 1 , h 1 as a secret key and a public key, respectively.
In the IDKEA1, a prover P (with a secret key x) proves its identity to a verifier V (with a public key q, g 1 , h 1 ) as follows.
1
• V randomly selects a from Z q and computes g 2 = g a 1 . V sends g 2 to P . As seen above, the IDKEA1 needs two exponentiations for a prover and two exponentiations and a two-exponent multi-exponentiation for a verifier, and it needs four messages exchanged. (Assuming (as in [8] ) that a two-exponent multi-exponentiation takes 1.2 t exp , the time for a verifier is dominated by 3.2 t exp , where t exp denotes the time to compute an exponentiation.) Thus, the IDKEA1 is not so efficient as the Schnorr scheme in computations and communications. However, the IDKEA1 has the security proof with tight reduction without loss of the security.
Security of the IDKEA1
We prove the security of the IDKEA1. In the proof, the simulator can open the cheating prover's commitment in two different ways: one by the non-black-box extractor of the KEA1 assumption and the other through the simulated transcript. This means we don't need to rewind the cheating provers.
Security under the passive attack
Security of the IDKEA1 under the passive attack is proven under the DLA and KEA1 assumptions with tight reduction. G is both (t , )-DLA and  (t , )-KEA1 , then the IDKEA1 scheme ID with the generator G is (t, )-secure under the passive attack with
Theorem 1 If the generator
t ≤ Min 1 2 (t − 6.4t exp ), t ≥ +
(t exp denotes the time to compute an exponentiation in the group generated by G).
Proof Assume we have a passive adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ) against ID = {K, P, V }, running in time at most t, which succeeds in impersonating the honest prover P with probability at least . We use A to construct a KEA1-adversary H running in time at most t and we use A and H to construct a DL-extractor E running in time at most t with the advantage Adv E at least − (≥ ). The stated result follows. Let q, g 1 , h 1 be generated as in K:
On inputs q, g 1 , h 1 , the DL-extractor E proceeds as follows.
1
• E starts the adversary A 1 with inputs q, g 1 , h 1 . When A 1 makes a query , E computes
and answers A 1 with a transcript (g 2 , (c 1 , c 2 ), r , m ) . Note the simulated transcript is distributed just as the real one between an honest P and V . Suppose A 1 halts and outputs a string St.
2
• E starts the adversary A 2 with the input St and with random coins R. E randomly selects a from Z q , computes g 2 = g 
3
• Consider the following KEA1 adversary H on inputs (of the above) q, g 1 , g 2 and w = St, R:
E invokes the corresponding extractor H * to H on the same inputs and gets m * 0 :
In the above, note that the extractor E opens the commitment 
If Ext holds, we have
By the second equation of Equation (1) and Equation (2), we see
Thus,
By the definition of Ext and Imp,
Now since the running time of H is bounded by the running time of A 2 , it is not greater than t . So, by the assumption of G being (t , )-KEA1, we have
Then, by Equations (3), (4) and (5), we have
and
Here, as easily seen from the description of E, the running time time(E) of E includes the running time of A, the running time of H (which is less than the one of A) and is otherwise dominated by the four exponentiations and the two two-exponent multiexponentiations. Assuming (as in [8] ) that a twoexponent multi-exponentiation takes time 1.2t exp , we have time(E) ≤ 2 · t + (4 + 2.4)t exp ≤ t , as desired. 2
Security under the concurrent attack
Under the OMDL+ and KEA1 assumptions, IDKEA1 is proven to be secure even under the concurrent attack also with tight reduction.
Theorem 2 If the generator G is both (t , n + 1, )-OMDL+ and (t , )-KEA1, then the IDKEA1 scheme ID with the generator G is (t, n, )-secure under the concurrent attack with
Proof Assume we have an adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ) against ID = {K, P, V } in the concurrent attack, running in time at most t and making interactions with at most n prover clones, which succeeds in impersonating the honest prover P with probability at least . We use A to construct a KEA-adversary H running in time at most t and we use A and H to construct an OMDL+ solver I that runs in time at most t , making at most n+1 queries to the challenge oracle, with the advantage Adv I at least − (≥ ). The stated result follows. Let q, g 1 be generated by
On inputs q, g 1 , the OMDL+ solver I proceeds as follows.
1
• I randomly chooses a from Z q and computes g 2 = g a 1 . I sends g 2 to the challenge oracle CO g 1 to get the response h 1 (= g
). I starts the adversary A 1 with inputs q, g 1 , h 1 .
2
• When A 1 sends the message g * 2 (i) to some prover clone (in the i-th session), I forwards the message g * 2 (i) to the challenge oracle CO g 1 and get the response c 
In the above, note that the solver I opens the commitment 
1 .
By the second equation of Equation (6) and Equation (7), we see 
Then, by Equations (8), (9) and (10) Here, as easily seen from the description of I, the number of queries made by I to the challenge oracle is at most n + 1 (one in generating the simulated public key and n in generating the commitments for A 1 ). The running time time(I) of I includes the running time of A, the running time of H (which is less than the one of A) and is otherwise dominated by the (3+n) exponentiations and the one two-exponent multi-exponentiation. Assuming (as in [8] ) that a twoexponent multi-exponentiation takes time 1.2t exp , we have time(I) ≤ 2 · t + (4.2 + n)t exp ≤ t , as desired. 2
Conclusion
The paper has shown an identification scheme IDKEA1 which is an enhanced version of the Schnorr scheme by making the prover's commitment extractable. Although it needs four exchanges of messages and slightly more exponentiations than the Schnorr scheme, ID-KEA1 is proved to be secure under the KEA1 and DLA assumptions with tight reduction. Moreover, using the variant OMDL+ of the OMDL assumption, we proved IDKEA1 is secure even under the concurrent attack also with tight reduction.
